

Bolivia Guerrilla Dried With Guerrilla

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LAPAZ, Oct. 11—The death of Che Guevara—which seems confirmed to the degree that human capability permits—can also be read as the obituary of the seven-month-old Communist guerrilla campaign in Bolivia's southeastern jungles.

But, in fact, from the very outset of the guerrilla activity the United States has gone to great lengths to avoid close identification with the Bolivian armed forces, the repression of the left, and the Bolivian guerrilla movement. It was to suck the United States into a massive military involvement here.

They also delivered the troops and equipment.

This is not to say that Washinton maintained a strict hands-off policy. There was a definite acceleration of certain military supplies previously earmarked for Bolivia. Some additional U.S. military personnel were brought in—notably a Special Forces counter-insurgency team whose job was to train a Bolivian ranger battalion in anti-guerilla tactics.

Scattered remnants of the 100-odd Bolivians, Cubans and others that originally launched the campaign are still at large and probably will be for some time. But their status now is that of fugitives wandering the vast lands that is the Bolivian backwoods.

However, all this personnel including the Special Forces advisers, was carefully kept far removed from the area where the guerrillas were operating. During the entire period U.S. military personnel in Bolivia has never totaled more than about 150.

As to the CIA, there probably

The guerrillas' disarrayably is some justification to regard the end, at least for the suspicion that it played a key, of Guevara's apparent discreet advisory role here. To the first in a series of attempts to transform Bolivia into the first in a series of other countries, scattered display of photographs and other evidence about Guevara across Latin America.

Ever since the August meetings of Latin revolutionary groups in Havana, it has been apparent that one of the main aims of the Cuban-supported

But whatever the degree of poor one that has a long history of violence. Discontent with the present regime is rather widespread. Its terrain of towering Andean peaks and dense jungle is ideal for insurgent activities.

As a result, from their first appearance in late March until the middle of August, the guerrilla bands had been able to strike almost at will against army patrols, commanded largely of badly trained, teenage conscripts. The army lost more than 30 men while the guerrillas suffered only one known casualty.

By mid-August, however, events indicated that the guerrillas were suffering a severe erosion of their existing supplies and were unable to get replenishments from sympathizers in the cities. In addition, they made the mistake of expanding out of their original zone of operations, where they had been able to move about unimpeded, into areas where their mobility was greatly lessened and their available escape routes greatly reduced in number.

At the same time, the Bolivian army was transferring more seasoned troops in and those already on the scene were learning the hard way. By the end of September, the guerrillas had suffered heavy losses and were known to be in a general state of rout. At this point, military sources which had accumulated considerable evidence pointing to Cuavevara's leadership revealed that the shadowy Cuban and its exhausted companions had been bottled up in a re-

Camiri. A tense cat-and-mouse game followed, culminating Sunday in a bloody fight where four guerrillas were killed. The following day, the Bolivian high command announced officially that Guevara, brought to the end of his rope by asthma and rheumatism, was among them.

Yesterday, Ovando told reporters that before dying of his wounds Guevara not only admitted his identity but also confessed that his Bolivian campaign had failed.